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Cut-Off Points for Depletion Purposes
BY CHARLES F . REINHARDT

Partner, Los Angeles Office
Presented at Tax Meeting of the National Western Mining Conference, Denver — April 1960

ALL OF us who deal with the determination of the taxable income and
tax liability of an enterprise are well aware that the entire field
is confused. About the only things certain are that taxes are too high,
relief is not in sight, and that the rules, law, and regulations are becoming more complicated.
It seems that the mining industry is one that has more than its
share of problems. W e have to know what expenditures are exploration, when exploration stops and development begins, when development stops and operation begins, what type of property right constitutes an economic interest, what properties shall be aggregated,
what rate of percentage depletion applies, what is gross income from
the property, what is net income from the property, and what is the
cut-off point.
The purpose of this paper is to discuss cut-off points. Normally a
mine owner extracts the ore or other natural resource and must apply
a number of treatment processes before the material extracted is ready
for sale. Frequently mine owners do not sell the material until it has
undergone a considerable amount of processing. Some of these
processes are basic and are needed to obtain something that is saleable,
whereas in other cases the process may be thought akin to manufacturing. The determination of a cut-off point becomes important to
find out how much of the income realized may become the base on
which depletion can be computed.
The Internal Revenue Code provides that percentage depletion
shall be allowed at a specified rate on gross income from the property.
The Code further states that gross income from the property means the
gross income from mining. The term mining is defined as "including
not merely the extraction of the ores or minerals from the ground but
also the ordinary treatment processes normally applied by mine
owners or operators to obtain the commercially marketable product or
products and transportation of ores or minerals from the point of
extraction from the ground to the plants or mills in which the ordinary
treatment processes are applied." (Transportation values for distances
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in excess of 50 miles may be denied.) The Code also defines ordinary
treatment processes.
In its simplest form a cut-off point may occur if a mine owner or
operator applies a process not specifically mentioned in the Code to
the ore or mineral before he sells the ore or mineral. It then becomes
necessary to consider each unnamed process and ascertain if it is a
mining or a manufacturing process. If it is concluded that such
process is truly a mining process it should be allowable and the value
of the ore and mineral after such treatment is recognized.
Most of the litigation before the courts is based on the question
of whether certain processes applied by taxpayers to their ores or
minerals represent ordinary treatment processes, manufacturing
processes necessary to obtain a saleable product, or manufacturing
processes applied to upgrade a saleable product. It appears desirable
to recite the facts in a few of these cases and then try to draw a few
conclusions from them.
COAL
I do not know how much interest, if any, you people have in the
cut-off problems of taxpayers engaged in the coal mining industry.
There was a situation several years ago in the coal industry, relating
to allowable processes, which is related to a real problem now facing
the uranium mining industry, and I think it should be discussed.
Prior to World W a r II, a number of coal producers found that it
appeared desirable to treat bituminous coal with a fine spray of oil
for the purpose of allaying dust. This treatment enabled coal producers to sell domestic stoker coal on a more competitive basis with
oil or gas.
One of these coal producers, Black Mountain Corporation, computed its depletion on the market price it received for its coal whether
oil-treated or not. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue held that
depletion could not be allowed on the increased value of the coal as a
result of the oil spraying, as such treatment was not a mining process.
Deficiencies of less than $800 were determined for each of the years
1948 and 1949. Testimony filed with the Tax Court showed that from
1940 to 1949 less than 10 per cent of the bituminous coal produced was
so treated and less than 10 per cent of the coal mines oil-sprayed coal.
The Tax Court, in its decision promulgated on February 25, 1954, held
that the oil spraying was not an ordinary treatment process. The
proceeds attributable to such process could not be included in gross
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income from the property for the purpose of computing percentage
depletion.
The impact of this decision was shown to Congress and in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, enacted in August 1954, Congress
amended the law regarding the ordinary treatment processes applicable to coal mining. The section dealing with coal provided that dust
allaying and treating to prevent freezing are considered ordinary
treatment processes.
Thus Congress, by statute, provided that those operators who oilsprayed coal for purposes of allaying dust could compute depletion
on gross income including any portion attributable to the dust-allaying
treatment. Congress, by statute, designated the dust-allaying process
as an ordinary treatment process in the sense that it became an allowable process. It seems important to note also that Congress took this
step in spite of the fact only a small portion of the coal was so treated.
It seems clear also that any coal producer could apply one of the dustallaying processes and not find he was confronted with a cut-off point.
URANIUM
Uranium mining has come of age within the last twenty years.
Its growth was accelerated by the vast amount of research in the war
period that resulted in the atomic bomb.
The industry, as I understand it, differs from the other metal mine
industries in that many of its members are relatively small operators
and are not integrated producers such as we find in the copper mining
industry.
Through the Atomic Energy Commission, government control of
the market has had an important effect on the industry. For example,
the A E C buys the concentrates, yellow cake, which it processes to
obtain the end products. It also has purchased the ore in certain
quantities in order to stimulate the search for and development of new
sources of ore. A date has been set after which the A E C will no longer
purchase anything but the concentrates.
The concentrating process is a fairly expensive one and an important investment is required for such a plant. Some mine owners
can operate such plants and sell their concentrates in acceptable form.
Other mine owners either have to sell their ore to concentrators or
perhaps contract with others to perform the concentrating.
Concentrating of ores has long been treated as an ordinary mining
process. It has been so specified in the appropriate sections of the
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Internal Revenue Code. It is my understanding that the Internal
Revenue Service ruled privately that the proper cut-off point for the
purpose of determining gross income from the property for the depletion computation was at the point where the concentrated ore or yellow
cake was obtained. About a year ago, I understand that a Revenue
Agent in this area took the position the cut-off should be made prior
to the concentrating process. The matter was not resolved locally and
I am informed that the question was presented to the National Office
of the Internal Revenue Service. A s of a recent date no answer had
been issued to the local Revenue Agent's office in spite of the fact the
Internal Revenue Code clearly states concentrating is an ordinary
treatment process for metal mines.
CHEMICAL AND METALLURGICAL LIMESTONE

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has contended that taxpayers engaged in the production and sale of chemical or metallurgical
grade limestone have a cut-off problem. The Centropolis Crusher
Company case illustrates this problem.
The taxpayer mined, processed, and sold chemical and metallurgical limestone. The named processes were blasting, hauling to primary
crusher, primary crushing, secondary crushing or grinding, automatic
screening, and grinding in a roller mill. The entire process was automatic and resulted in the production of eight sizes ranging from two
inch to fine ground (the latter portion passing a 200-mesh screen). The
taxpayer bagged a small portion of the fine ground stone.
About 80 per cent of the sales were of crushed rock and only 20
per cent of the sales were of the fine ground material. The 80 per cent
of sales were made at an average price of $1.50 per ton whereas the
remainder was sold at an average price of $5.00 per ton. Upon appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the representatives of
the Commissioner contended that the fine grinding was a process
applied after a commercially marketable product had been obtained.
They argued that it could not be allowed as a mining process.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court
and held that all of the processing constituted ordinary treatment
processes. Revenue from bagging was disallowed as an item of gross
income from the property.
The representatives of the Commissioner pointed out what they
conceived was an inconsistency in the Iowa Limestone Company case
wherein it was held that the fine ground material (substantially all of
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the sales) was the first commercially marketable product. It was their
view that all producers of chemical and metallurgical grade limestone
should be required to compute gross income at the same cut-off point
regardless of processes employed.
The Court rejected the idea that there was only one commercially
marketable product. It pointed out that Section 114(b)(4)(B) of the
Internal Revenue Code referred to "the ordinary treatment processes
normally applied by mine owners or operators in order to obtain the
commercially marketable mineral product or products."
L I M E S T O N E FOR C E M E N T

There have been a number of cases dealing with the cut-off point
in the cement industry. Some of these cases are Dragon Cement Co.
Inc., Monolith Portland Cement Co., Riverside Cement Co., and California
Portland Cement Co.
Limestone used for the manufacture of cement became eligible for
percentage depletion in 1951. The rate was fixed at 10 per cent which
was subsequently increased to 15 per cent in 1954. The Internal
Revenue Service stated that it would allow percentage depletion computed on the value of the stone as it entered the kiln where it was
burned to form a clinker. The clinker was subjected to a finishgrinding process later to produce finished cement. The value was
determinable under the proportionate-cost theory which I will discuss
later. Depletion generally was computed and allowed on this basis.
Subsequently, as a result of the decision in the Cherokee Brick and
Tile Company case, cement companies filed claims for refund based on
the position finished cement was the first commercially marketable
product and, on rejection thereof, filed suits in the various District
Courts. The results have been favorable to the taxpayers.
In the Dragon case the District Court held that the first commercially marketable product was the finished cement. It was further
held that the charge for placing cement in bags was properly includible
in gross income from the property. The decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Supreme Court declined
to take jurisdiction.
The Monolith case was tried in a District Court in California and
the Court held that finished cement was the first commercially marketable product. It was held, however, that gross income from the
property did not include the charge for bags. It was further held that
a discount of 20 cents per barrel must be charged against income from
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the property. The decision of the District Court was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
The Riverside case was heard in the same District Court as the
Monolith case. The Court held also that the first commercially marketable product was finished cement and that gross income from the
property included the charge for cement in bags and that the discount
of 20 cents per bag was a cash discount not chargeable against gross
income from the property. The case was taken to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit but was settled out of court.
The California case was also tried in the same District Court in
California as the Monolith and Riverside cases. It was also held that
the first commercially marketable product was finished cement. It
also was held that gross income from the property included the charge
for loading cement in bags and that the discount was a cash discount
not required to be charged to gross income from the property. The
California case is now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court.
It might seem inconsistent that the same court would hold differently on the bagging and discount issues for Monolith than for the
other two companies. Actually Monolith in the year under trial was
limited to a deduction based on 50 per cent of net income from the
property. Its case showed bagging costs to be greater than the bagging
charge made to customers so that its depletion deduction was greater
if it did not make an argument as to these points. This position
presumably would not prejudice its position in later years as the other
two cases were decided subsequently to the Monolith case.
FIRE CLAY

There have been several cases decided by the various courts regarding cut-off points for fire clay, brick, and tile clay. A t the present
time there is one important case on the calendar of the Supreme Court.
It is now expected that the case will come to trial sometime in May
1960 and it concerns the Cannelton Sewer Pipe Company. The pertinent facts are set forth hereinafter.
The taxpayer owned deposits of fire clay and shale in and around
Cannelton, Indiana. It extracted the fire clay and shale from these
deposits and applied the processes necessary to produce vitrified sewer
pipe and related products. During the year 1951, for which the claim
for refund was filed, the taxpayer produced about 38,500 tons of clay
and processed all but 80 tons of ground clay into vitrified clay sewer
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pipe and related burnt-clay products. The taxpayer never sold raw
fire clay or shale and it never purchased any for use in its processing
activities. In the presentation of its case the Government produced
evidence to the effect that more than 25 per cent of the fire clay
produced in 1951 was sold in the raw state and as to that produced
in Indiana that year about 60 per cent was sold in the raw state.
Testimony presented at the trial in the District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana indicated that the raw clay and shale was
mined in several ways in the area. Some producers were operating by
strip mining methods incidental to and in conjunction with strip
mining of coal. Another group of operators strip-mined the clay which
had been laid bare by previous operators. These types of operation
differed considerably from that of the taxpayer which operated an
underground mine. Evidence presented to the Court indicated that the
various strip miners could and did sell clay in the area for a delivered
price ranging from $1.60 to $1.90 per ton. The taxpayer could not
compete in this market as its mining costs alone were about $2.40 per
ton. It was also asserted that the strip miners could not sell all their
production at the above-named prices.
Depletion granted at 15 per cent to the strip miners who sold raw
clay at $1.60 to $1.90 per ton would amount to $0.24 to $0.285 per ton.
The taxpayer computed depletion on its sales on the basis of 15 per
cent as to 60 per cent of its gross income (fire clay) and on the basis of
5 per cent as to 40 per cent of its gross income (shale). The weighted
depletion deduction was $4.03 per ton.
The District Court denied the argument made by the Government
that the field price of raw clay should fix the amount of gross income
on which depletion should be computed and held for the taxpayer. The
case was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and
that Court issued its opinion on June 15, 1959 affirming the decision of
the lower court. Subsequently the Government petitioned for a writ
of certiorari which was granted by the Supreme Court.
Recently the National Coal Association has requested permission
to file a brief amicus curiae in the Cannelton Sewer Pipe Company case.
It is my understanding that the concern of the National Coal Association arises from the fact that the Commissioner's representatives in
arguing for a cut-off point at the raw-clay stage were denying the
taxpayer the right to compute value after crushing and grinding
which are named processes. This approach, if upheld, would appear to
jeopardize the present status of ordinary treatment processes of coal.
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C O M M E N T S REGARDING T H E CITED CASES

The issue in the coal company case was whether a taxpayer had
the obligation to exclude from gross income any benefit derived from
a process not specifically classed as an ordinary treatment process. The
oil spraying was applied prior to the loading which was a treatment
approved by statute. The oil spraying was not done to obtain a higher
price for the coal but in order to permit sales to a type of customer not
otherwise available to the taxpayer. It would appear that this oil
spraying should have been regarded as an ordinary treatment process.
The Tax Court did not so hold and Congress later specified in the
Internal Revenue Code that dust allaying was an ordinary treatment
process.
In the chemical and metallurgical limestone case the issue appeared to be, "What is the meaning of grinding as an ordinary treatment process?" The Internal Revenue Code defines crushing and
grinding as an ordinary treatment process. It also allows pulverization
of talc to be classed as an ordinary treatment process. The taxpayer
had to fine-grind about 20 per cent of its output in order to sell it. If
one turns to the dictionary for an answer it is probable that he will
conclude, as I did, that the three words are substantially interchangeable. I discussed this question with an engineer once and he indicated
that the three words were substantially the same in meaning but that
by ordinary usage pulverizing implied a finer degree of crushing. In
any event, anyone who has ever had a chance to observe a crushing
operation will know that fine particles begin to appear as soon as the
operation of crushing starts. Crushed material has to be sorted by size
to be saleable in most cases.
In the uranium case it does not appear that the proposed position
of the Internal Revenue Service is tenable. In my opinion as long as
the Internal Revenue Code states that concentrating is an ordinary
treatment process normally applied by mine owners or operators the
gross income from the property would have to be the value of the ore
after the concentrating process if the ore was sold in that form.
The limestone-for-cement cases are important for a number of
reasons. In the first place, the courts uniformly held that there was no
real commercially marketable mineral product short of the finished
cement. In the second place the record showed that all of the companies tried to sell all their cement in bulk and only bagged what could
only be sold in such form and, except in the Monolith case where it
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was not a real issue, the courts found that the bagging was a necessary
process to obtain a commercially marketable product. In the third
place, except as to the Monolith case where it was not a real issue, the
discounts offered were to be treated as cash discounts not deductible
from gross income of the property so long as their purpose was to
encourage prompt payment. This was held even though the discounts
were more substantial than in many businesses.
The fire-clay case is of considerable interest and deals with the
concept that a manufacturing process may, in effect, be classed as an
ordinary treatment process if there is no commercially marketable
mineral product without such treatment. The court accepted the
evidence that large amounts of raw clay were sold but set forth the
requirement that sales at a profit must be available before a process
is excluded.
The position of the Internal Revenue Service has been and is that
of requiring every producer to value his output at the lowest form
anyone anywhere sells any product. The Service does not regard it
important, as in the Cannelton case, that a producer had a mining cost
of $2.40 per ton compared with a selling price of $1.60 to $1.90 per ton
for competitors. It appears to take the position every producer must
regard his gross income to be $1.60 to $1.90 per ton irrespective of
costs, markets, or other factors. Such a position, if upheld, would
mean that Cannelton would be considered to have sustained a loss on
its mining operation of $0.50 to $0.80 per ton and a manufacturing
profit of $0.50 to $0.80 a ton greater than its over-all profit. If its
properties were discovered and therefore had no tax basis the taxpayer
would be entitled to no deduction for depletion, either percentage or
cost. This result is contrary to the general premise on which percentage depletion is allowable.
In March 1959, hearings were held before the Ways and Means
Committee of Congress. Representatives of the Treasury Department
presented their position as to cut-off points. M r . David Lindsay presented some data regarding depletion allowable to owners or operators
of iron ore deposits. He stated that iron ore was saleable at $8.00 per
ton and two tons of iron ore represent the equivalent of one ton of pig
iron. He further stated that one steel producer is claiming the. right
to depletion on a selling price of $295 for one ton of structural steel
bolts. The iron ore producer would have a depletion deduction of
$2.40 (15 per cent of $16.00) whereas the producer who carried his ore
to the structural bolt stage would have a depletion deduction of $44.25
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per ton (15 per cent of $295). This situation is the basis for his demand
that a uniform base be applied to all in an industry. It may be conceded it is difficult to support the claim of the structural bolt manufacturer but the proposal of Mr. Lindsay would penalize any producer
but the most efficient one in the industry and the one best situated
from a market position. Other producers presumably could not compete effectively and their profit margins would probably be lower.
No one likes to see provisions in the Internal Revenue Code that
are restrictive but it is just as inequitable to have broad provisions
that can create hardships and unintended results without any way of
affording correction or relief.
COMPUTATION PROBLEMS

After it has been determined that a cut-off point exists it then
becomes necessary to determine gross income of the ore or mineral at
such point and also the net income from the property at such point.
If the cut-off point is one that provides a saleable product the
determination of gross income from the property may be made by
reference to such market prices if the situation is realistic. The regulations also provide that, in the absence of a representative market
price, gross income from the property may be computed under the
proportionate-cost theory. This approach requires obtaining the ratio
of costs at the cut-off point to total costs and applying such ratio to the
selling price of the product.
Consideration of this latter method will make it clear that a producer who has high primary costs will fare better than a lower-cost,
more efficient producer. Let us assume that for two producers the
total cost of production is $2.00 per unit. If producer A has a cost at
the cut-off point of $0.40 per unit his gross income from the property
would be 20 per cent of the total selling price whereas if producer B
has a cost at the cut-off point of $0.60 per unit his gross income from
the property would be 30 per cent of the total selling price. In a competitive market the selling prices might be very similar so that B's
deduction for depletion would be 50 per cent greater than that of A .
This is a simple example and it might be that in actual practice total
costs of the two would not be similar. Furthermore the result might
be distorted by the 50 per cent of net income limitation.
One will find that an advantage can be had by increasing pre-cutoff point costs. It is realized that this point may require a change in
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the accounting practices of taxpayers but there are some possibilities.
It might be perfectly proper to take accelerated depreciation with
respect to assets used in operations prior to the cut-off point and
straight-line depreciation for assets used subsequent to the cut-off
point.
In one case I have found that the records of a taxpayer carried all
laboratory costs in one account. Analysis was made of the laboratory
operation and it was found that a substantial part was attributable to
control of ore quality and other projects prior to the cut-off point.
Benefit was obtained by properly allocating such costs.
Sometimes taxpayers are conducting a research program that has
as its purpose the development of new products. Such costs can be
frequently treated as non-mining and by exclusion from costs beyond
the cut-off point can be handled so as to increase the deduction for
depletion.
Sometimes a study of the manner of allocating overhead will
reveal that owing to changed operating conditions the method should
be changed. In a proper situation this can benefit a taxpayer.
Taxpayers sometimes incur expenses that are purely financial.
Proper consideration of these items might result in increasing the
limitation based on 50 per cent of net income from the property. For
example, a taxpayer might acquire a plant for the conduct of a purely
manufacturing activity such as the fabricating activities of some of
the large integrated companies. If it is necessary to borrow funds for
the construction of such new plant it would appear feasible to segregate such funds, use them for the construction project, and treat the
interest thereon as an expense not entering into the depletion computation.
The recent court decision in the Monolith Portland Cement Company case which was decided in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
suggests a possibility that should be explored. The Court held that
the taxpayer could not include the charge to customers for placing
cement in bags as a part of its gross income from the property. Faced
with this situation, the taxpayer was able to show that the cost of such
bagging activity exceeded the charge to customers and by submitting
to a cut-off point prior to the bagging operation the taxpayer was able
to increase its net income from the property. Its depletion deduction
was based on 50 per cent of net income from the property. Perhaps
a careful study by other taxpayers of their costs would produce benefits of the sort obtained by Monolith.
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I have run across other instances where a taxpayer was arguing
that he had to process part of his output in order to sell it. His claim
was disputed by the Internal Revenue Service and on study of the
situation it was discovered that net income from the property did not
increase proportionately to the added costs. The taxpayer found out
he had a greater depletion deduction by accepting an earlier cut-off
point and treating all his output as though sold at such cut-off point.
Each one of you present should consider the cost-accounting
practices of his own business and approach this problem in an analytical way in order to discover any practices that have adversely affected
the depletion deduction.
SUMMARY

In conclusion it can be said that cut-off points are a real controversial item. On the one hand we have the Internal Revenue Service
asking for a uniform cut-off point on an industry-wide basis, not
necessarily with regard to economic realities, and the taxpayers asking
for differing cut-off points according to the economic facts of life. So
far the courts for the most part have been inclined to recognize the
requirement that a commercially saleable product must be obtained
before the cut-off point will be recognized. Perhaps the Supreme
Court will resolve the matter by its decision in the forthcoming
Cannelton case or perhaps its decision will only make one of the participants seek legislative relief.
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